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We are, as Neugebauer puts it, in the fortunate position that we know
almost nothing about Claudius Ptolemy except that he was a Greek sci-
entist who lived and worked in Alexandria in the second century of the
common era (CE) (Neugebauer, 1975:834). We have to study his sci-
entific works and not extraneous material about his dining habits or his
love life. His important work was done about 150 CE. He produced im-
portant surviving contributions in optics, harmonics and other areas. He
produced a work on astrology, regarded as an important science in an-
tiquity. However, his most significant contributions were in geography
and astronomy. In both areas, he produced texts which were to survive
as the canonical texts for more than twelve hundred years. With the ex-
ception of Euclid’s (Euklides’) Geometry, some of the works of
Archimedes on Statics and Galen’s (Klaudios Galenos’) anatomical
works, they are the only western scientific works to be central texts for
anything like this period of time. Although earlier Babylonian and
Greek researchers had done reasonably precise mathematical work in
astronomy or geography, the detailed assimilation of rough empirical
data into a mathematically precise work by Ptolemy far surpasses any-
thing we know to have existed in antiquity in these areas. He relied to
some degree on work done by Hipparchos (fl.150 before the common
era [BCE]), whom he mentions many times. There has been a long-
standing debate as to the degree to which Ptolemy is dependent on
Hipparchos. The general scholarly consensus is that although he learnt
much from Hipparchos, Ptolemy produced some fundamental break-
throughs and worked out many of the details which were necessary to
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make Hipparchos’s system work.1 For my purposes, it does not matter
whether Ptolemy’s work is the culmination of a post-Aristotelian astro-
nomical and geographical tradition in which Hipparchos is the central
figure or whether Ptolemy is the central figure in that tradition.
The quality of the work of Hipparchos and Ptolemy was not widely
understood in the period following the scientific revolution of the sev-
enteenth century because the dominant tradition of historical writing about
science was a “whiggish” scientific hagiography. This tradition aimed
to produce edifying stories about the great figures who discovered fun-
damental principles and facts. Scientists like Ptolemy, who had been mis-
taken about the nature of the solar system and the movement of the earth,
were often regarded as enmeshed in scholastic a priori dogmas or igno-
rant of obvious empirical facts.2 In the twentieth century, serious his-
torical work showed that Ptolemy was an important figure who had
done very significant work in astronomy and geography. However, by
and large, his contribution was seen as mathematical and geometrical.
Methodologically, he was usually thought to be just a follower of
Aristotle or some other great figure. His broader scientific contribution
was also thought to be minor. 
Two views have been common amongst historians and philosophers
of science in recent times. The first and more popular view presents
Aristotle as laying the foundations of ancient and medieval science and
sees the revival of the study of Aristotle in western Europe in the thir-
teenth century as laying the groundwork for the seventeenth century sci-
entific revolution. On this view, Aristotle was wrong about the funda-
mentals of physics and astronomy, but his careful empirical studies and
his systematic and well argued position enormously facilitated the
1 See, for instance, Lloyd, 1987 and Evans, 1996.
2 Suzanne Roux has pointed out to me that the great nineteenth-century British philoso-
pher/scientist William Whewell is an exception. In his historical and philosophical
works, Whewell presents Hipparchos and Ptolemy as figures who made the scien-
tific revolution possible through their path-breaking work (Whewell, 1857).
However, even Whewell presents Ptolemy's contribution as largely mathematical.
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development of a far better account. The second view holds that
Archimedes is the greatest ancient scientist because he saw nature in
mathematical and geometrical terms and developed a rigorous geomet-
rical methodology which allowed him to discover the fundamental
mathematical and geometrical principles of Statics. On this view, the re-
discovery of Archimedes’ work, and the application of Archimedes’ math-
ematical treatment of nature to kinematics and dynamics, led to the sci-
entific revolution. Galileo’s application of Archimedes’ methodology to
motion is often presented as the pivotal event in the scientific revolution.3
Neither view sees Hipparchos or Ptolemy as very important scientists.
Since the 1970s, Geoffrey Lloyd and others have argued that
Ptolemy’s work is the acme of the development of the ancient exact sci-
ences (Lloyd, 1973:113–35; Lloyd, 1987; Taub, 1993). On this account,
Ptolemy’s system and methodology is probably the finest product of a
(largely) post-Aristotelian astronomical tradition mainly developed in
Alexandria in Egypt. Ptolemy often used observation and tested his mod-
els against observation while avoiding the deeply misleading features of
naive observation. Ptolemy also sought mathematical precision and pro-
duced an account of reality which was fundamentally geometrical and
mathematical. However, unlike Plato and his school, Ptolemy did not fall
into the trap of developing a purely a priori geometric account of reality. 
The part of Ptolemy’s work on which I will be focusing is the
Mathematiki Syntaxis (mathematical compilation), known to Arab and
western European scientists as the Almagest. Much of that work is a
highly technical manual indicating how to calculate astronomical phe-
nomena with reasonable accuracy. I am not competent to discuss any of
the technical details as my trigonometry and geometry are elementary.
My interest is in what some non-technical parts of the work reveal about
Ptolemy’s method. I will argue that his arguments for the sphericity of
3 Very roughly, the first view is that of Pierre Duhem and his followers, and the sec-
ond that of Alexander Koyré and his followers. For a detailed account of these and
other views, see Floris Cohen, 1994.
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the earth reveal that Ptolemy’s methodology resembles the methodology
of the modern exact sciences far more than that of Aristotle. 
Consider a view recently articulated by Maurice Finocchiaro, one of
the foremost authorities on Galileo and the history of early modern sci-
ence: Aristotle elaborated the physics and astronomical system of the an-
cient geocentric world view. Ptolemy contributed “primarily the math-
ematics and the quantitative details of the astronomical system”.
Finocchiaro admits that Aristotle and Ptolemy differ on the details of the
system. But according to him, central arguments, like those proving the
sphericity of the earth “were known to Aristotle and can be found in his
writings” (Finocchiaro, 1997:8). The view Finocchiaro puts has been
widely accepted, perhaps because it underlies the account Thomas
Kuhn produced more than forty years ago in his enormously influential
textbook, The Copernican Revolution (Kuhn, 1957).
As is often the case, Aristotle is given a central role. Yet when one
looks at Aristotle’s arguments for sphericity, they are weak and not part
of a mathematically systematic view. The principal arguments are
stated in On the Heavens (Peri Ouranou).4 At 294a there is an argument
rebutting evidence for the view that the earth is drum shaped. The evi-
dence is that the sun at its setting and rising shows a straight instead of
a curved line. Aristotle argues that this evidence is inconclusive. Part of
his reasoning is that if the earth’s circumference is very great, it will pre-
sent an appearance of straightness on a very distant object whether it is
spherical or not. Quite right. But this does nothing to show that the earth
is spherical and neither does Aristotle claim it does.
At 297a there are some a priori arguments regarding the natural ten-
dencies of earthly matter – these are scientifically worthless, although
Aristotle seems to regard them as primary. 
4 I have followed the normal convention in referring to passages in Aristotle, which
is to refer to page numbers and column letters of the standard edition of the works
of Aristotle, edited by Bekker. These page numbers and column letters are repeated
in Aristotle, 1971.
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At 297b–298a there are two arguments from observation. The first is
that the demarcation line between the light and dark portions of the
moon’s disc during a lunar eclipse is always convex. According to
Aristotle, this shows the sphericity of the earth. As Neugebauer has
pointed out, this argument is inconclusive because “there exist an un-
limited number of shadow casting and shadow receiving bodies which
produce identical shadow limits” – furthermore ancient geometers, like
Aristotle’s predecessor Eudoxus, would have known this from their geo-
metrical studies and from simple optics (Neugebauer, 1975:1094). For
instance, the well known ancient hypothesis that the earth is drum shaped
might explain this fact just as well. 
The second argument is that as we move north, features of the celestial
sphere change. A small change in our position north or south visibly al-
ters the position of stars we see above us. Further, stars visible in the north
are not visible in southerly lands such as Egypt or Cyprus. This argument
is a little more promising, but it fits reasonably well with the drum shaped
earth and, on its own, probably could be fitted around other shapes fairly
easily. 
All that Aristotle has produced in his arguments from observation is
arguments for curvature in one axis (north/south). They are not arguments
for constancy of curvature. Perhaps the earth curves to the north in some
funny wiggly way. Perhaps the earth curves constantly to the north but
is drum shaped. At any rate, there is not enough here to make a case for
sphericity. Of course, Aristotle is no fool. He seems to think that the a
priori arguments do most of the work. But, as I say, they are scientifi-
cally worthless.
It might well be possible to put together the two arguments Aristotle
presents into a single more powerful argument with the use of a little
geometry. However, there is no sign that Aristotle intended anything of
the kind in the text. Recently, Geoffrey Lloyd has cast doubt on
Aristotle’s knowledge of astronomy and on his contribution to astronomy
(Lloyd, 1996a:160–83). On Lloyd’s account, Aristotle not only made no
significant contribution to mathematical astronomy, he showed little
32
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awareness of the problems raised for his physics by many empirical facts
which were well known to Greek astronomers in Aristotle’s time.
Insofar as he tries to deal with such problems, his solutions are very poor.
If Lloyd is right in thinking that Aristotle’s grasp of astronomical mat-
ters is weak, he may be garbling a more convincing argument for the
sphericity of the earth which had been presented by a contemporary as-
tronomer. However, this is conjecture.
Later Greek scientists presented more rigorous arguments for the
sphericity of the earth. Amongst these scientists were Theon of Smyrna
and Cleomedes. (Both probably lived in the second century CE.)5
Ptolemy presents the most rigorous set of arguments (H15–H17).6
Some of his arguments are also found in Theon or Cleomedes. 
Ptolemy starts by trying to find mathematical regularities revealed by
the empirical data in order to systematically rule out other possibilities by
showing that they cannot plausibly explain the observations. He argues
his case both for an east/west direction and a north/south direction. He be-
gins by pointing out that the sun always rises earlier further east. The time
of rising is in proportion to the distance between the places involved. We
know this, he says, because although lunar eclipses occur at the same real
time for all observers, they always occur at a later hour after solar noon
for observers further east. This indicates regular curvature (H15).7
5 Ptolemy mentions a Theon as a source of some of his data (H275), but Theon was
a common name in the period, so it is unclear whether it is the same Theon. For a
brief discussion of these writers, see Evans, 1998:49–51. A problem with Evans is
that he believes Aristotle's argument is decisive.
6 I have followed the normal convention in referring to passages in the Almagest, which
is to refer to pages of the Heiberg edition of the Greek text, which are repeated in
Ptolemy, 1984.
7 Toomer points out that “it seems probable the only  eclipse observed at places widely
separated in longitude for which he [Ptolemy] had records  of both observations was
the eclipse of – 330 Sept 20 ... observed at Arbela and Carthage” (Ptolemy,
1984:75). (In non-astronomical terms, the lunar eclipse of September 20, 331 BCE
observed at Arbela, in the middle of the Persian empire, and Carthage, in the mid-
dle of the coast of North Africa.) It would, of course, have been far easier to get data 
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This argument is followed by arguments which are intended to rule
out the other broad possibilities: that the earth is concave, that the earth
is plane, that the earth has some polygonal shape. For instance, Ptolemy
argues that if the earth were plane, the stars would rise and set for all
observers simultaneously (but they do not). Ptolemy rules out the
cylindrical or drum shaped earth by tying to his argument for regular cur-
vature in the east/west direction a more elaborate version of the argu-
ment advanced by Aristotle for the north/south direction (H16). An im-
portant difference is that he stresses the regularity of the phenomena.
He tells us that as we move further north, there is a regular change in
the stars which are visible.
Ptolemy uses variants of the eliminative methods of induction, dis-
cussed in great detail by John Herschel and John Stuart Mill in the nine-
teenth century. These methods are methods by which a researcher can nar-
row down a range of causes of an event to one cause. It is widely accepted
that the use of these and similar methods is an important part of scien-
tific method.8 It is difficult to find these methods used at all systemat-
ically in Aristotle. Ptolemy not only uses them to argue that the earth is
spherical, but also to argue that the heavens move like a sphere, that the
earth is in the middle of the heavens and that the earth does not have any
on lunar eclipses observed simultaneously at places which were closer together. Greek
and Babylonian astronomers had been regularly observing the heavens for a long time
and occasional references to all sorts of observations make clear that Ptolemy had
access to a great deal of data. Liba Taub mistakenly cites Toomer in support of the
very implausible claim that “Ptolemy probably only had a record of one lunar eclipse
observed in two places” (Taub, 1993:71). Puzzlingly, Neugebauer, who is cited cor-
rectly by Taub, supports her view (Neugebauer, 1975:938). However, elsewhere
Neugebauer states that comments made by Heron in Alexandria in the first century
CE indicate that he had no reliable time interval available even for Alexandria and
Rome (Neugebauer, 1975:667). This means that Heron had an unreliable time interval
for the distance between these two cities. If Heron had such a time interval available,
there is little doubt that Ptolemy would have had such time intervals available. All
Ptolemy would have needed to support his argument is a few very rough time mea-
surements made at places some distance apart.
8 For recent succinct discussions, see Couvalis, 1997:80–4; Oldroyd, 1986:148–56.
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motion from place to place (H10–H26). Of course, he is wrong about all
of these claims except the claim that the earth is spherical. But this only
shows that the methods are defective if some crucial premises are in-
correct. Scientific research is a very risky business in which even the best
theories can fail radically. As is well known, Newtonian mechanics is
false, even though in 1900 it was the best confirmed theory in the his-
tory of science.9
I should note that Galen and other post-Aristotelian medical thinkers
often used the eliminative methods, even though Galen’s methodolog-
ical position, which is derived from Aristotle, is that medicine should
strive for axiomatic demonstration from principles which are obvious a
priori (Lloyd, 1996b:199–206). However, unlike Galen, Ptolemy’s
methodological pronouncements are empiricist (Lloyd, 1987; Taub,
1993:44–45).
A second feature of Ptolemy’s method is that he thinks he can ex-
trapolate inductively when he finds a rough mathematical regularity (such
as that revealed by the local time at which lunar eclipses are observed).
From a few of these, he will fill in the gaps and extrapolate to other cases.
Finding something that roughly fits a mathematical regularity gives him
confidence that he can extrapolate to other cases. This is similar to the
method used by various modern physicists or astronomers.10 By contrast,
Aristotle’s epagoge (induction) does not contain this mathematical ele-
ment. Of course, Ptolemy needs to use this type of inductive inference
to make his argument work. In deductive logic, it is perfectly consistent
with the data he mentions that the earth should be a half sphere, with the
antipodes being flat. Further, eliminative induction will not help argue
that the antipodes are curved, as he has no knowlede of antipodean as-
tronomical data.
9 See Couvalis, 1997 for  detailed discussion of the problems raised for methodology
by the failure of Newtonian mechanics.
10 Lloyd points out that sometimes Ptolemy doctors his results in an attempt to
squeeze them into neat regularities covered by a law which is formulable in math-
ematical terms (Lloyd, 1987:246).
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A third feature of Ptolemy’s method is mathematical idealisation of
experience for scientific treatment. He idealises the earth to be a perfect
sphere although he knows it is not, because it is such a sphere “as a
whole” and mountains etc. are negligible in relation to the size of the
earth.11 Elsewhere, he argues that the ratio of the size of the earth to the
distance between the earth and the fixed stars is, to the senses, that of a
point to any distance. That is to say, the earth is not literally a point, but
is so small in relation to the distance between it and the fixed stars that
it can be treated mathematically as if it were a point (H20–H21). 
Famously, mathematical idealisation is found in Archimedes’s works
on Statics and Hydrostatics (e.g. Archimedes, 1987:286). It also occurs
in many works produced in the post-Aristotelian exact sciences, partic-
ularly in Alexandria. As Alexander Koyré pointed out many years ago,
such idealisation occurs everywhere in Galileo and Newton. It contin-
ues to be a central feature of modern physics. (This is what caused Koyré
to argue, somewhat misleadingly, that Galileo and Newton had basically
applied Archimedes’ methodology to kinematics and dynamics [Koyré,
1965, 1978].) Nancy Cartwright has recently argued very plausibly that
mathematical idealisation is necessary for progress in physics and
many other sciences (Cartwright, 1983, 1989). Aristotle has little inter-
est in idealisation, though Platonists clearly understand its importance.
The trouble with Platonists, unlike Ptolemy, is that they don’t understand
the importance of testing idealised models against observation. 
A close comparison of Aristotle’s and Ptolemy’s arguments for the
sphericity of the earth supports the conclusion that Ptolemy’s method-
ology is far more like that of the modern exact sciences than is the
methodology of Aristotle. Ptolemy’s argument is also far more con-
vincing. This is further evidence that Ptolemy was not merely a great
mathematician, but a scientist of the first order.12
11 Theon of Smyrna produced a “proof” that mountains and depressions on the earth are
negligibly small in relation to the size of the earth. For details, see Evans, 1998:51–2.
12 Liba Taub has recently argued very plausibly that Ptolemy’s scientific work is 
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